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We investigate the relationship of "shared capitalist" compensation systems - profit/gainsharing, employee
ownership, and stock options - to the culture for innovation and employees' ability and willingness
to engage in innovative activity.   Using a large dataset with over 25,000 employee surveys in over
200 worksites of a large multinational organization, we find that both shared capitalism compensation
and high performance work policies contribute to these innovation outcomes.  Owning company stock
is the most consistently positive compensation variable in predicting both an innovation culture and
willingness to engage in innovative activity.  We also find that shared capitalism and high performance
work policies have stronger effects in predicting an innovation culture when they are combined, and
that the effects of shared capitalism and high performance work policies are partially, but not wholly,
mediated through greater employee alignment with company strategy.  The findings are consistent
with agency theories predicting that the principal agent problem can be addressed by a combination
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Politicians are saying it:  Michigan’s Governor, Jennifer Granholm, revealed her plan to 
overhaul the world’s automotive center into the innovation capital of the United States, stating 
“the power of creativity in propelling our economy is a fundamental building block of our state’s 
transformation” (Michigan Governor Talks, 2006). Likewise, the President of China, Hu Jintao, 
early in 2006, called for a transition from a manufacturing based economy to one based on 
innovation, recognizing that innovation is a means for China to drive their developing economy 
further up the value chain. Supporting this, China has announced plans to increase the percentage 
of GDP dedicated to R&D spending from 1.2% to 2.5% by the year 2020 (Einhorn, 2006; 
Something New, 2006).   
Organizations are enacting it:   In 2005, P&G acquires Gillette stating, “Getting the 
shopper to spend more comes down to innovation--the critical driver of consumer loyalty--and 
productivity. By doing this acquisition, we'll have more products and more innovation…” 
(Lafley & Sellers, 2005). Similarly, leaders at Ford Motor Company acknowledge that their 
biggest challenge to succeeding in the current economy is restoring consumer’s sense of 
confidence in the company, and say that innovation will be the means to achieve this. 
Underlining this importance, Ford lists “Innovation is our mission” on its home page (Elliott, 
Szczesny, 2006). 
Academics are researching it:   Recognizing the importance of innovation for the 
competitive advantage of organizations and larger economies, researchers are actively seeking to 
better understand various environmental, organizational, and individual factors which influence 
innovation outcomes. For example, Jaffe, Lerner, and Stern (2006) examine the role economic 
policies play as drivers or inhibitors of innovation activities.  Other organizational research aims 4 
 
to understand the organizational factors and individual differences which impact employees’ 
willingness to adopt organizational innovations (Klein & Sorra, 1996). 
Finally, employees are listening:  Media outlets such as CNN, Business Week, and The 
USA Today report stories such as, “A Century of Innovation,” “The World’s Most Innovative 
Companies,” “Champions of Innovation,” and “The Fabric of Creativity.” 
Whether it is due to globalization, expanding markets, low cost competition, or 
demanding customers, the need for innovation has been heard echoing from Capital Hill, to Wall 
Street, to the television sets of the average American. In the battle for continuous innovation, 
organizations play a critical role in fueling the development and production of these products, 
services, and processes.  
Unlike the traditional view of innovation as the activity performed by the lone R&D 
scientist working in isolation, today’s organizations embrace the ideas and insights of employees 
at all levels of the organization. For example, Whirlpool credits their successful product 
innovations not to a couple of departments, such as engineering or marketing. Instead, they say 
that they have harnessed the power of a 61,000-employee workforce, providing the means for all 
levels and job functions to contribute and develop product, service, or processes innovations 
(How Whirlpool Defines, 2006). 
  Given the new organizational context for innovation, it is important to understand how 
employees at all levels of the organization can be managed to direct and align their behaviors to 
achieve innovative outcomes. For example, Annalee Saxenian, in her seminal work on 
organizational innovation, contrasts two traditional innovation hubs of America:  Silicon Valley 
in California and Route 128 surrounding Boston. Her work indicates that two management 
practices, organizational structures and rewards, were critical to accounting for differences in 5 
 
innovation output. Silicon Valley spawned innovation through shared capitalism incentives and 
the use of teams, while innovation in the Boston corridor was stymied by bureaucratic top-down 
approaches to organizational structure and rewards.  
  Likewise, in their book In the Company of Owners, Blasi, Kruse, & Bernstein (2003) 
examined in detail one innovation sector, the 100 largest corporations that built, run, and sell on 
the Internet.  They highlight the major role that shared capitalism practices, such as employee 
ownership, profit sharing, and broad based stock options, in combination with a participative 
culture, can make in promoting organizational innovation.  
  Recognizing the importance of innovation for today’s organizations, this study will 
examine the role shared capitalism and high performance work policies play as a means to 
achieve innovation outcomes. Additionally, we will examine a process mechanism, employee 
alignment, as one way in which shared capitalism and high performance work policies impact 
innovation outcomes.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Can shared capitalism promote innovation? 
We broadly define shared capitalism as organizational incentive systems which seek to 
align the interests of the employee with the owner by sharing the residual return. In this way, 
self-interested employees will seek to increase their residual return by working to achieve 
organizational objectives.  Shared capitalism incentives may be at the group or team level 
through gainsharing plans, or at the organizational level through profit sharing, employee 
ownership, or broad-based stock option plans.  6 
 
An extensive body of knowledge has accumulated on the impact that different forms of 
shared capitalism have on workplace outcomes. In general, the research indicates that shared 
capitalism has a positive influence on workplace outcomes. For example, there is evidence for 
the positive impact of shared capitalism on human resource outcomes such as turnover, loyalty, 
and worker effort (Freeman, Blasi, and Kruse, 2007).  In addition, research supports the 
importance of shared capitalism for accounting- and market-based measures of performance (see 
Kaarsemaker, 2006, and Kruse and Blasi, 1996, for reviews).  While shared capitalism plans are 
associated with somewhat better performance on average, there is substantial variation among 
individual companies, and a number of studies show no evidence of impact on workplace 
outcomes. One important reason for this variation appears to be differences in employment 
cultures, employee participation, and workplace practices that may be complements to shared 
capitalism in affecting workplace performance (Kruse et al., 2005). 
While this cumulative body of literature on shared capitalism has greatly enhanced our 
understanding of the field, gaps in the research still remain. One such gap is the impact of shared 
capitalism on innovation outcomes. A review of the prior research identified four articles which 
discuss or examine the importance of shared capitalism in achieving product, service, or process 
innovations.  
  Gamble (2000) finds reduced R&D expenditures in firms where ESOPs own larger 
blocks of stock and argues that this reflects management entrenchment and managerial risk 
aversion; in contrast, Kruse (1996) finds that R&D expenditures are a strong predictor of  the use 
of a profit-sharing plan, and Sesil et al. (2002) find positive effects of broad-based stock options 
in  high technology knowledge-based industries,  noting that ‘for firms, in which new product 
development is crucial for success, such as in many knowledge-based industries, broad-based 7 
 
stock options can reduce the agency problem, resulting in greater output’ (p. 276). Most recently, 
and supporting Sesil et al’s perspective, Lerner & Wulf (2006), using a sample of 300 publicly 
traded R&D centralized firms, found that the compensation of corporate R&D heads had 
dramatically shifted in the 1990’s, with a heaver reliance on long-term incentives such as stock 
options. They find long-term incentives are positively and significantly associated with number 
of patent filings, patents perceived value (patent citations), and patent generality.  
While research that examines the role of shared capitalism as a means to achieve 
innovation outcomes is in its infancy, social and behavior psychologists have actively examined 
the impact of individual rewards on creative behavior (Amabile, 1983; Deci & Ryan, 1985; 
Eisenberger and Selbst, 1994). Thus, we briefly present empirical evidence and theoretical 
perspectives from the social and behavioral schools of psychology. 
Social-cognitive psychologists assert that creative behavior has defining characteristics 
that make it distinguishable from other human behavior; in particular creative behavior is 
dependent on employees’ intrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1983; Deci & Ryan, 1985). Thus, the 
aim for social-cognitive psychologists is to uncover the conditions which enhance employee’s 
intrinsic motivation. According to this line of reasoning, extrinsic rewards, such as shared 
capitalism, will have a detrimental effect on employee’s intrinsic motivation and ultimately their 
creative behavior by directing employee’s attention towards the reward itself over the task at 
hand. 
In contrast, behavioral psychologists argue that the effort needed to complete activities is 
an unpleasant sensation produced by repeated or intense performance of any behavior. 
Reinforcements, such as rewards, are a means by which organizations can reduce this unpleasant 
sensation. If an employee is rewarded for putting in a large amount of effort in an activity or 8 
 
behavior (for example through shared capitalism) it reduces the adverse impact of such behaviors 
and increases this behavior in the future.  In effect, reinforcements work to control employee’s 
creative behavior by decreasing the unpleasant sensations associated with the cognitive effort 
needed to perform creativity.  
Empirically, an abundance of studies in the past 30 years have been conducted to 
understand if and under what conditions rewards enhance or inhibit creative behavior, with 
contradictory results and conclusions. Recognizing the conflicting evidence, five meta-analyses 
aimed to bring cohesion to the divergent results (Rummel & Feinberg, 1988; Wiersma, 1993, 
Tang & Hall, 1995; Cameron, & Pierce, 1994; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Deci, Koesterner, 
& Ryan, 1999). Of the five, the strongest support for the Cognitive Evolution Theory comes 
from Deci, Koestner, & Ryan (1999) who combined 128 studies to find that all tangible and 
intangible rewards undermined intrinsic motivation. However, conclusions from Eisenberger & 
Cameron’s (1996) extensive review indicate that: (1) the detrimental effects of rewards tend to 
occur in highly restricted, easily avoidable conditions, (2) mechanisms of instrumental and 
classical conditions are basic for understanding incremental and detrimental effects of reward on 
task motivation, and (3) the positive effects of rewards on performance are easily attainable 
using procedures derived from behavioral theory.   
Taken together, past theory and empirical work on creativity and rewards has failed to 
provide an understanding of how best, if at all, to reward employees to achieve creative behavior. 
Additionally, the application of this research to organizational setting is restricted. First, the 
majority of studies in this field have been conducted outside of organizations and relied heavily 
on school children, making the generalizability of these finding limited. Second, organizations 
are increasingly employing group/team or organizational incentives over individual incentives as 9 
 
a means to encourage cooperation and alignment (Blasi et al., 2006). Thus, studies examining 
individual incentives provide only a limited understanding of the full range of workplace 
incentives. Third, the sample sizes of studies mentioned above are generally small. For example, 
of the 128 studies examined in Deci, et al.’s (1999) meta-analysis the largest sample was 249, 
with the majority of sample sizes well under 100.  While significant effects can often be detected 
with these sample sizes (depending on the study design), a contribution of this study to the 
current literature is the large sample size obtained in an organizational setting (more than 25,000 
employees in hundreds of work sites) with data on several types of workplace incentives.   
Can employment practices promote innovation? 
In contrast to the limited research on organizational incentives, innovation management 
scholars have actively researched individual human resource management policies which impact 
innovation outcomes, including job design (Hackman & Oldham, 1980), selection (Woodman, 
Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993; Iansiti, 1995), training (Wheatley, Anthony, & Maddox, 1991), and 
performance management (Mehr & Schaver, 1996). Mumford (2000) reviews an extensive body 
of literature examining specific human resource management policies that support innovation 
and creativity. Building on this review, the following sections summarize the management 
policies that are supportive of innovation and creativity in organizations. 
Selection. The consistent development of innovative products, services, and processes 
requires a workforce with the necessary breadth and depth of technical skills (Amabile & 
Gryskiewicz, 1987; Iansiti, 1995), in combination with a constant flow of new ideas and 
experience (Bontis, Crossan, & Hulland, 2002; Jackson & Schuler, 2002). Staffing practices 
work as a means to ensure a consistent flow of technical skills, by identifying and selecting 
applicants who will add new ideas and experience to the organization. Researchers have 10 
 
examined the employee characteristics supportive of innovation:  divergent thinking (Guilford, 
1950), technical expertise (Amabile & Gryskiewicz, 1987; Mumford, 2000), and certain 
personality characteristics (Amabile, 1988; King, 1990).   
Training & Job Rotation. Maintaining employees’ current knowledge and skills, while 
developing new knowledge and skills, is essential to innovative performance (Cohen & 
Leventhal, 1990; Mumford, 2000).  Two HR policies vital to maintaining and developing 
employees to achieve innovative outcomes are training and development (Leonard-Barton, 
1992). A firm’s potential to be innovative and creative is enhanced as the new knowledge and 
abilities are incorporated into the organization (Jackson & Schuler, 2002; Cohen & Leventhal, 
1990). Thus, past research has noted the importance of sabbaticals, subtracting assignments, self-
study programs, conferences, external courses, and job rotations as important mechanisms to 
enhance an organization’s ability to innovate (Dougherty, 1992; Mumford, 2000; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003; Amabile, 1983).   
Performance Management. Performance evaluations have been both negatively and 
positively associated with individual innovation and creativity (Amabile, 1979; Shalley, 1995).  
For instance, Amabile (1979) found that individuals who expected their artistic task to be 
externally evaluated had significantly lower levels of creativity on the task than individuals not 
being externally evaluated.  In contrast, Shalley (1995) conducted two studies with samples of 
undergraduate students; the results of both studies indicate that expecting an evaluation is not 
necessarily harmful to people's creativity.  The variance in empirical evidence may be explained 
by the type of performance evaluation.  Performance appraisals should not have specific 
performance objectives or difficult production outcomes (Mumford, 2000; Oldham, 2003). 
Instead, appraisals are most conducive to creativity when they consist of broadly defined goals 11 
 
and objectives that allow employees flexibility as to what the final outcome will be (Mumford, 
2000). 
Rewards (Recognition). As mentioned above, evidence for the impact of individual 
rewards on creative behavior is mixed. However, for those researchers who support the role of 
rewards or recognition (both intrinsic and extrinsic) for creativity, other questions remain such as 
the skills, behaviors, or outcomes that should be rewarded.  For instance, Henderson and 
Cockburn (1994) in their investigation of the pharmaceutical industry suggest firms that promote 
researchers according to their standing in the scientific community enjoyed higher productivity 
levels.  Additionally, rewards should not be withheld from employees who step out of 
established roles or fail to achieve desired outcomes.  Instead, a better approach is to reward 
employees for their effort or progress toward an innovation/creative goal or objective (Mumford, 
2000). Finally, Dougherty (1992), after extensive field research on product development, 
suggests that rewards should be provided for the development of expertise, skills, and 
competencies. Thus, beyond compensation, other forms or rewards and recognition can be used 
to enhance creative behavior. 
Employee involvement. Empowering employees and utilizing teams are two mechanisms 
through which employee participation can enhance organizational innovation (Mumford, 2000).  
Christensen and Raynor (2001) argue that successful product innovation requires big decisions to 
be driven down to the lowest level. They reason that decisions about products, services, and 
processes innovations should be made on the spot, instead of waiting for a response from further 
up in the organization.  Additionally, Jelinek & Schoonhoven (1990) note employee involvement 
helps employees to see their part in the innovation process while creating a shared responsibility 
in the outcome. Supporting this, Leonard-Barton (1994), in her study of innovative projects 12 
 
groups, found that empowerment is most important for innovative capabilities. Those project 
teams who were empowered felt ‘exhilarated by the challenges they had created’ (p. 117).   
Teamwork. The use of team-based work is a popular mechanism for enhancing 
innovation. Innovations involve different types of tasks and processes, and thus are rarely the 
creation of one individual or a single department.  Team-based work has been argued to increase 
the speed of product innovation (Hayes, Wheelwright, & Clark, 1988), the number of 
innovations (Dougherty, 1992), and the value of the innovation (Ven de Ven, 1986).  For 
example, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) conducted a qualitative study where they found that the use 
of cross-functional teams is central to the product development process. Additionally, effective 
product development was not housed in solely specialized R&D activities; instead the most 
effective product development came from creating linkages between various departments within 
the organization. Thus, the use of teams enhances product innovation through the diversity of 
knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Systems Perspective. While the above policies appear to be valuable for innovation, 
recent work recognizes the importance of examining HRM policies as a bundle or system of 
policies as opposed to individual policies in isolation (MacDuffie, 1995; Huselid, 1995; 
Ichniowski et al., 1996; Blasi and Kruse 2006). A central tenet of the systems approach is that 
organizations should create a high degree of internal consistency among their HRM policies 
(Barid & Meshoulam, 1988). Systems of HRM policies which are designed to utilize the 
knowledge and skills of the workforce have been labeled as “high performance,” “high 
involvement,” “high commitment,” “HR sophistication,” and “HR investment.”   
Interestingly, there is wide disagreement on what policies constitute “high performance.” 
A review by Lepak, Liao, Chung, and Harden (2006) highlights the disparate and at times 13 
 
conflicting policies making up high performance systems. While disagreement remains over the 
policies represented in a “high performance” work system, it is generally agreed that a high 
performance work system (HPWS) can impact various organizational outcomes. Collectively, 20 
years of cumulative research has found HPWS are strongly associated with outcomes including 
HRM outcomes (i.e., turnover, absenteeism, job satisfaction), organizational outcomes (i.e., 
productivity, quality, service), financial accounting outcomes (i.e., ROA, profitability), and 
capital market outcomes (i.e., stock price, growth, returns) (Coombs, 2006; Becker & Huselid, 
2006).
1 
 As noted above, employee knowledge and skills are critical to achieving innovation 
outcomes. Thus, it is surprising that the systems approach has had limited application to 
innovation outcomes.  Studies of high performance workplace bundles have so far tended to 
focus on operational or financial performance without measures of innovation.  Given the limited 
empirical evidence, our study seeks to fill this gap by examining the impact of HPWS on 
innovation outcomes. 
Taken together, the limited empirical work examining the effects of shared capitalism 
and HPWS on innovation outcomes represents a gap in the literature that needs to be addressed. 
Our interest is to examine the relationship between shared capitalism, HPWS, and innovative 
outcomes, in addition to the intervening mechanisms that uncover how these relationships occur. 
The following theory and hypotheses development provides the rational for why we expect these 
relationships to occur. 
 
                                                      
 
1   Despite these positive performance outcomes, bundles of high performance workplace policies appear to have 
very low incidence among firms (Blasi and Kruse 2006).  See Ichniowski et al. (1995) regarding the barriers to 
adoption of high performance policies. 14 
 
THEORY & HYPOTHESES  
Laffont and Martimort (2003) describe the principal-agent problem as a fundamental one 
for the firm: “Indeed, for various reasons the owner of the firm must delegate several tasks to the 
members of the firm.  This necessity raises the problem of managing information flows within 
the firm…The starting point of incentive theory corresponds to the problem of delegating a task 
to an agent with private information” (2003: 2-3).  For the purposes of this article, one can think 
of the problem of innovation as how to get the members of the firm interested in working alone 
or together to use their information to achieve innovation that will profit the owner of the firm.  
They cite the early work of both Chester Barnard and Charles Babbage in defining the relevance 
of shared capitalism for the agency problem.  For example, Babbage wrote: 
The general principles on which the proposed system is founded, are: 1. That 
a considerable part of the wages received by each person should depend on 
the profits made by the establishment; and 2. That every person (our 
emphasis) connected with it should derive more advantage from applying any 
improvement he might discover than he could by any other course.”  (Laffont 
and Martimort 2003: 11 quoting Babbage 1989:Vol 8: 177) 
 
One can readily see that Babbage is specifically addressing both shared capitalism and 
innovation (“any improvement”).  Barnard’s views were more explicit and more extreme when 
he wrote: 
An essential element of organizations is the willingness of persons to 
contribute their individual efforts to the cooperative system… Inadequate 
incentives mean dissolution, or changes in organizational purpose, or failure 
to cooperate. Hence in all sorts of organizations the affording of adequate 
incentives becomes the most definitely emphasized task in their existence. It is 
probably in this aspect of executive work that failure is most pronounced.  
(Laffont and Martimort 2003: 12 quoting Barnard 1938:139) 
 
The research on the effect of individual incentives on innovation is mixed, as noted above, while 
the research on teamwork generally shows it to be positively related to innovation efforts.  One 
of the purposes of shared capitalism plans is to enhance teamwork by creating greater 15 
 
cooperation and information sharing among co-workers, and between workers and 
supervisors/managers.  Based on this our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis One:  Shared capitalism incentives are associated with a workplace culture 
that is supportive of innovation efforts. 
Hypothesis Two:  Shared capitalism incentives are associated with a greater 
willingness of employees to report innovative ideas. 
In line with our interest in exploring the impact of employment culture, specifically high 
performance work systems, on innovation, past theorists have given some thought to the role of 
organization design as a complement to incentives.  
For example, Barnard virtually defined the high performance work system when he wrote 
about what Laffont and Mortimort call “nonmonetary  incentives” as including: “ personal 
nonmaterial opportunities; ideal benefactions; . . associational attractiveness; adaptation of 
conditions to habitual methods and attitudes; opportunity of enlarged participation; [and] the 
condition of communion.”  Barnard stressed that what we think of as financial incentives had to 
be “reinforced by other incentives,” specifically referring to these organizational  components 
(Laffont and Martimort 2003: 12 quoting Barnard 1938:142).   
In a modern economy where workers are often not manipulating physical objects, much 
of work itself is inside the mind of the worker and is about collecting, communicating, sharing, 
manipulating, and combining information in novel and innovative ways. Physical monitoring by 
supervisors as a solution to the agency problem is very hard in these environments. Many of the 
features of high performance work systems that theorists like Huselid have defined are essential 
to innovations  are based on information. A number of these high performance policies can 
create conditions that favor innovation:  good wages and benefits can produce high commitment 16 
 
and loyalty; selective recruitment can get the most informed and curious persons into an 
organization; training can upgrade their informational and cooperative skills; teamwork and job 
rotation can break down “rigid silos” between them; and employee involvement can bring them 
closer to the information that  both customers and management possess.   This is not dissimilar 
from the classic agency theory notion of the "revelation principle" in which societies have a 
problem in how to get “informed agents (to) reveal private information to a planner who 
recommends actions” (Laffont and Martimort 2003: 26-7). One can conceive of a high 
performance work system as a workplace mechanism to make the revelation principle work.   
Based on the theory and research linking high performance work systems to 
organizational performance, we expect that an HPWS will also contribute to an innovative 
culture and activity, and will complement shared capitalism plans. Our next four hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis Three:  High performance work systems are associated with a workplace 
culture that is supportive of innovation efforts. 
Hypothesis Four:  High performance work systems are associated with a greater 
willingness of employees to report innovative ideas 
Hypothesis Five:  Shared capitalism plans have a positive interaction with high 
performance work systems in predicting a workplace culture that is supportive of 
innovation efforts. 
Hypothesis Six:  Shared capitalism plans have a positive interaction with high 
performance work systems in predicting willingness of employees to report innovative 
ideas. 
Finally, we expect that if the above effects exist, they operate in part through greater 
alignment of employees with the company’s strategy.  Our final two hypotheses are: 17 
 
Hypothesis Seven:  Individual alignment with company strategy mediates the 
relationship of shared capitalism and high performance work systems to a workplace 
culture that is supportive of innovation efforts. 
Hypothesis Eight:  Individual alignment with company strategy mediates the 
relationship of shared capitalism and high performance work systems to the willingness 
of employees to report innovative ideas. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data Set 
The NBER Shared Capitalism Research Project developed a dataset to better understand 
how shared capitalism impact innovation outcomes. The data set includes employee surveys 
from a single company with a broad profit sharing program and opportunities for employee 
ownership. This company agreed to participate in a larger shared capitalism study that included 
14 organizations, described in more detail in the companion paper by Kruse, Blasi, and Park 
(2006).  Unique to this company, the survey asked a series of questions about organizational 
innovation.  The survey was administered in 2006 via paper and web-based administration. A 
total of 27,825 usable surveys were returned for a response rate of 67.3%. Missing data for one 
or more of the variables reduced the sample to 25,014 respondents who had complete data for all 
of the variables.  
Measures 
Human Resource Management. The 5-P model (Schuler, 1992) identifies the various 
ways in which HRM activities can be examined, as philosophies, policies, programs, practices, 
or processes. This study will examine HRM policies and practices.  18 
 
Policies, as defined here, are the broadly defined HRM activities. For example, 
performance-based pay is a broadly defined measure of a HRM activity, but it can be 
implemented through a number of different practices. By assessing HRM policies, a researcher is 
able to cast a wide net in understanding the HRM activities within the organization. However, 
HRM policies limit the detailed information on what specific practices make up a policy.   
Alternatively, HRM practices are the specific HRM activities which are employed to 
implement a HRM policy.  For example, under the policy of pay-for-performance there are 
different HRM practices that can be employed to achieve the pay-for-performance policy. 
Assessing specific HRM practices provides a level of detail missed by HRM policies. In this 
study, the primary interest is the impact of shared capitalism, and its various forms, as a means to 
achieve innovation outcomes. Thus, we examine the individual shared capitalism practices and a 
combined shared capitalism index that can be utilized to achieve innovation outcomes, discussed 
in more detail below.  
We examine two systems of HRM policies. First, we analyze a high performance work 
system (HPWS) which includes employee participation, training, job rotation or cross-training, 
selection, job security, and information sharing. The majority of questions (listed in Appendix A) 
ask the respondent to report if s/he is covered by this policy.  Second, a high performance work 
system measure was included which asked employees their perceptions of the effectiveness of 
each high performance policy for their work area or team. This measure thus localizes and 
focuses the estimation of the high performance practices within the group of workers 
immediately surrounding the respondent. This is notable, since most HRM scholars do not bring 
high performance work literature down to the lowest level of the organization (notable 
exceptions include Allen, Shore, & Griffith, 2003 and Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005). In 19 
 
particular, this index measures team effectiveness in the following areas: selection, performance 
goals, training, sharing information, meeting with customers, and rewards. This human resource 
policy index is referred to as high performance work system – team (HPWST).  
Shared Capitalism. As noted above, shared capitalism appears in a variety of forms. This 
study examines profit/gainsharing, employee ownership, and stock options.  Profit sharing and 
gainsharing are combined here because this firm has one program combining elements of each: 
bonus payments are based both on company-wide return on net assets, and on division 
performance. In addition, we examine the effects of individual incentives.  For each incentive 
plan, the presence of the incentive (yes/no) and the extensiveness of the incentive (as a percent of 
total fixed annual pay) are examined. Additionally, a thermometer-style index of shared 
capitalism was constructed. The index, described in Appendix B, reflects both whether workers 
have different shared capitalism programs and whether these programs represent a high 
percentage of the worker's fixed annual pay.   
Workplace Outcomes. After consulting with the research literature, two comprehensive 
measures of innovation were designed. The first is focused on measuring aspects of a firm’s 
culture for innovation. According to organizational theory on creativity, employees’ innovative 
behavior can be influenced by the environment or culture an employee encounters (Amabile, 
1988). Thus, an important outcome to understand is a culture that supports innovative behavior. 
An extensive review of the literature on cultures that support innovation revealed consistent 
characteristics across cultures that support innovation. For example, companies can promote 
innovation by fostering an environment that encourages employees to voice ideas or suggestions, 
provides the resources to further develop ideas, and recognizes the efforts of employees who do 
try to innovate (Scott & Bruce, 1994). Given the past literature, our study examines the 20 
 
characteristics listed above. The specific items for the culture of innovation scale are listed in 
Appendix A.  
The second measure focuses on individual employee’s willingness to marshal their 
innovative ideas and do something about it.  Innovative behaviour is characterized by a 
multistage process, with different activities or behaviours necessary at each stage (Scott & 
Bruce, 1994). In this study, we examine an employee’s ability and willingness to generate ideas, 
as opposed to their actual innovative behavior. Specific items developed to assess employee 
willingness to innovate are listed in Appendix A. 
Finally, we examine the extent to which employees are aligned with the goals and 
objectives of the organization (Huselid, Becker, & Beatty, 2005). Aligning employees with 
organizational goals and objectives has become an increasingly important task; especially in 
organizations where employees’ knowledge and skills play a critical role in achieving strategic 
objectives, such as innovation. It is through alignment that employees are aware of how they can 
contribute to achieving organizational objectives. Much of the work arguing for the importance 
of aligning employees behind shared goals and objectives has been at a conceptual level (Wright 
& McMahan, 1992; Boswell & Wright, 2002). Thus, this research contributes to the current 
literature by going beyond the importance of aligning HRM policies to organizational strategy 
(Huselid, 1995). It looks deeper into the organization for how employees, the individuals who 
implement strategic objectives, recognize and agree with them. Our interest is to examine if and 
to what extent shared capitalism and high performance work policies are effective means to align 
a workforce behind organizational objectives. Our measure combines four items representing 21 
 
employee understanding and agreement with the company strategy, and employee views of 




Culture for Innovation 
  Table 1 summarizes the empirical results on the relationship between shared capitalism, 
high performance work policies and employees’ perception of a culture for innovation. 
Shared Capitalism. In Models 1, 3, and 5 we examine the impact of the shared capitalism 
index on employees’ perception of a culture for innovation. The results reveal that the shared 
capitalism index is positively related to employees’ perception of a culture for innovation (Model 
1).  The shared capitalism index remains positively related when HPWST is added to the 
equation (Model 5), but not when HPWS is added (Model 3), so there is only partial support for 
hypothesis 1. 
 When the shared capitalism practices are broken out to examine their individual impact 
on employees’ perceptions of a culture for innovation (Models 2, 4, and 6), two shared 
capitalism practices are consistently related to employees’ perceptions of a culture for 
innovation: the percentage of base pay going to profit/gainsharing, and owning company stock.  
These results stay strong when adding in either the HPWS or HPWST measure, supporting 
hypothesis 1 for these two pay practices. 
High Performance Work Policies. A very consistent result in Models 3-6 is the strong 
positive association between human resource management policies and employees’ perceptions 
of a culture for innovation. An examination of adjusted R-squared with and without the human 
                                                      
 
2 We thank Mark Huselid for insightful comments and suggestions on developing the employee alignment scale. 22 
 
resource practices indicates that these practices greatly increase our ability to account for what 
might create a culture for innovation. These results support hypothesis 3 and underline the 
important role high performance policies have in creating and supporting a culture for innovation 
where employees are encouraged to innovate, are rewarded for this, and are provided the 
resources to do so. 
Innovative Ideas 
Table 2 summaries the empirical results on the relationship between shared capitalism, 
high performance work policies, and employees’ willingness and ability to innovate. 
Shared Capitalism. In Models 1, 3, and 5 we report the impact of the shared capitalism 
index on employees’ willingness and ability to contribute innovative ideas to the organization. 
The results, consistent with those reported for a culture for innovation, find that those employees 
who reported higher levels of shared capitalism also reported higher willingness and ability to 
contribute innovative ideas to the organization. These results remained significant after including 
measures of high performance work policies, supporting hypothesis 2.  
When the shared capitalism policies are broken out in columns 2, 4, and 6, employee 
ownership is again a significant positive predictor of employees’ willingness and ability to 
contribute innovative ideas to the organization. Unlike the results for culture of innovation, 
however, profit/gainsharing as a percent of pay is not a significant predictor, and in fact 
profit/gainsharing eligibility is a negative predictor in two of the models. These latter results 
contrast strikingly with the positive results for employee ownership, suggesting that profit 
sharing may focus workers toward short-term outcomes and away from activities with a long-
term payoff, while employee ownership helps promote behavior like innovative activity that will 23 
 
have a longer-term payoff.
3  This is because profit sharing in the organization under study 
specifically rewards employees for productivity and operational achievements (such as on-time 
customer delivery) of delivering current goods and services which the organization sees as part 
of its existing repertoire of offerings. Profit sharing is not, however, tied to ideas or prototypes 
for future goods and services.   
High Performance Work Policies. The impact of high performance work policies on 
employees’ willingness and ability to contribute innovative ideas to the organization is reported 
in Models 3-6. The results, across all models, reveal a consistent and significant positive 
relationship between both high performance work policy indexes and employees’ willingness 
and ability to contribute innovative ideas to the organization. Given these results, support was 
provided for hypothesis 4. Taken together, these results can be interpreted to signify that the use 
of high performance work policies is one way to increase employees’ willingness and ability to 
contribute innovative ideas to an organization. 
An interesting note is that in comparison to the HPWS impact on a culture for innovation, 
it appears that the HPWS impact is not as substantial for willingness and ability to contribute 
innovative ideas. We speculate that an employee’s ability to contribute innovative ideas may be 
accounted for by individual differences not captured in this study. For example, divergent 
thinking (Guilford, 1950), openness to new experience (Feist, 1998), and internal locus of 
control (Woodman & Schoenfeldt, 1989) have all been related to highly innovative or creative 
individuals.  
                                                      
 
3   This interpretation was supported by several company representatives at the conference where this paper was 
initially presented.  One person noted that ROI, which stands for return on investment, was sometimes referred to by 
employees as “repression of innovation” because a focus on short-term profitability discourages investments in 
innovative activities that have a longer-term payoff. 
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Complementarities between Human Resource Policies and Shared Capitalism 
An important proposition of the systems perspective is that organizational outcomes will 
be enhanced to the extent that a firm’s human resource management activities fit with and 
complement one another (Baird and Meshoulam, 1988). The underlying rationale is that the 
more strongly human resources fit together, the more consistent are the signals communicated to 
employees regarding the behaviors that are valued by the organization (Becker & Huselid, 1998). 
While fit can be tested using various statistical techniques (Venkatraman, 1989), we employ a 
fit-as-moderation hypothesis, testing whether the impacts of shared capitalism on innovation 
outcomes are dependent on the level of high performance work policies. Stated differently, we 
expect that the impact of shared capitalism on employees’ perceptions of a culture for innovation 
vary across levels of high performance work policies. To examine this, an interaction term was 
included in Table 3 (Models 1 and 2). 
The results indicate that shared capitalism does interact positively and significantly with 
both HPWS and HPWST and provides support for hypothesis 5. The fit between shared 
capitalism and HPWST was positively related to employees’ perception of a culture for 
innovation. Likewise, the interaction between shared capitalism and HPWS was positive and 
marginally significant. To further help with interpretation, the interaction results are portrayed in 
Figure 1 (using Table 3, Model 2). As seen there, shared capitalism has the most positive 
relationship to innovation culture when HPWST is at high levels, with a mild positive 
relationship when HPWST is at average levels.  The relationship is negative when HPWST are at 
low levels, indicating that employees may perceive the innovation culture poorly when they are 
given the incentives, but not the tools, to make a difference--in this case the shared capitalism 
may be perceived as primarily a shifting of financial risk to employees.  25 
 
There are very different results, however. in predicting willingness or ability to innovate.  
As reported in Table 3 (Models 3 and 4) we find that while the base effects are positive and 
significant, the interaction between the shared capitalism index and high performance work 
practices is negative and significant for both HPWS and HPWST. These results indicate that 
when employees are covered by high performance work practices, the impact of shared 
capitalism policies on their willingness and ability to innovate for the organization is reduced. 
Put another way, the positive base effects and negative interaction indicates that these two 
constructs may substitute for each other: the base effect shows that shared capitalism has a 
positive effect on innovative activity for those who are not covered by HPWS, but shared 
capitalism has a much smaller or neutral effect for those who are covered by HPWS. An HPWS 
appears to provide a strong effect on its own, perhaps making unnecessary the addition of shared 
capitalism incentives. 
To further help with interpretation, the interaction results are portrayed in Figure 2 (using 
Table 3, Model 4). Shared capitalism has a strong positive association with innovative ideas for 
workers with low values on HPWST, and only a mild positive association when HPWST is at 
high levels. These illustrate the point made above: high performance work policies and shared 
capitalist incentives may act somewhat as substitutes here, with shared capitalism providing the 
strongest incentives for contributing ideas among those who have not been encouraged to 
contribute ideas through high performance work policies. 
Alignment 
  Table 4 summaries the empirical results on the relationship between shared capitalism, 
high performance work policies, and organizational alignment.    26 
 
Shared Capitalism. The results listed in Model 1, 3, and 4 indicate that shared capitalism 
may play a significant and positive role in aligning employees behind the goals and objectives of 
the organization. Even in the presence of high performance work policies, shared capitalism 
continues to play a significant and positive role in employee alignment. There are different 
results when interacting shared capitalism with the two HPWS measures: the base effect of 
shared capitalism stays strong and the interaction is insignificant in Model 3, while the opposite 
is true in Model 6. It is therefore unclear whether shared capitalism operates on its own or only 
in combination with HPWS in affecting alignment.  The results of specific shared capitalism 
practices on employee alignment are also not consistent between the models controlling for 
different measures of HPWS. Stock option holding and profit/gainsharing as a percent of pay are 
predictors when controlling for HPWS, while profit/gainsharing eligibility and employee 
ownership as a percent of pay are predictors when controlling for HPWST. It is noteworthy that 
individual bonus eligibility (but not the bonus size) is a strong predictor of alignment, possibly 
reflecting greater bonus eligibility among high-level managers (not fully captured in the 
management level controls).  
High Performance Work Policies. Consistent with the results for a culture for innovation 
and innovative ideas, high performance work policies continue to have a strong impact in 
Models 1 to 6 of Table 4. An interesting finding is the relative impact of the HPWS vs. the 
HPWST on alignment. The adjusted R-square for the models with HPWST accounts for a greater 
amount of variance in the alignment of employees. This result could indicate that the greater 
impact on employee alignment is not when employees experience high performance policies 
(HPWS), but when they perceive these practices as effective (HPWST) in the context of their 27 
 
immediate local work group or team. This finding suggests that the level of measurement of high 
performance work practices is important. 
Complementarities between Human Resource Policies and Shared Capitalism. Once 
again, using interaction terms we examined the impact of the complementary relationship 
between human resource management policies and shared capitalism on employee alignment. 
The only significant result is reported in Model 6. Here shared capitalism interacts with HPWST 
and results in a positive effect on employee alignment. This result confirms the importance of 
ensuring that human resource policies and shared capitalism complement each other in order to 
achieve maximum benefits. Again, it is interesting to note that the interaction with shared 
capitalism was only significant with HPWST, which indicates the importance of perceived 
policy effectiveness in work groups over the mere presence of policies.  It appears that such 
practices need not only to be bundled together but need to be bundled together in a way that is 
seen as effective within a local work group. 
Mediating Role of Alignment 
Across the results, a consistent finding is that HRM policies and shared capitalism are 
related to employees’ perception of a culture for innovation and employees’ willingness and 
ability to contribute innovative ideas. However, it is not clear how HRM policies and shared 
capitalism impact these outcomes (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Ostroff & Bowen, 2000). For 
instance, management scholars have argued that HRM policies impact organizational outcomes 
through organizational culture (Ostroff & Bowen, 2000), organizational commitment (Allen, 
Shore, & Griffeth, 2003), and employee skills, motivation, and opportunities (Lepak, et al., 
2006).  28 
 
While the intervening mechanisms listed above are plausible, our interest is the impact 
HRM policies have in creating employee alignment. To test for mediation, three models are run 
to test four conditions (Baron and Kenny, 1986). First, the independent variable (HRM policies 
or shared capitalism index) must significantly impact innovation outcomes. Second, the 
independent variable must significantly impact the mediator (alignment). Third, with the 
independent variable in the equation, alignment must impact innovation outcomes. The fourth 
necessary condition is a decrease in the coefficient between the independent variable and 
innovation outcomes as alignment is added. Using this technique it is possible to assess if the 
coefficient between the independent variable and the outcomes decreased with alignment in the 
equation. The extent of reduction in the coefficient reveals how much of the relationship between 
the independent variable and dependent is indirectly working through the mediator (alignment). 
Finally, Sobel’s test is employed to ensure that the drop in the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero (Sobel, 1982). Tables 5 and 6 reports the results of the test of mediation.  
Shared Capitalism. The results in Tables 5 and 6 reveal that alignment does partially 
mediate the relationship between shared capitalism and employee’s perception of a culture for 
innovation. This is indicated by the reduction in the shared capitalism coefficient from Model 4 
to Model 6, and a significant value for Sobel’s test, in both tables.  Combined, these results 
suggest that one way in which shared capitalism impacts innovation outcomes is by aligning the 
workforce behind the goals and strategic objectives of the organization. However, the shared 
capitalism coefficient was not reduced to zero for either outcome, implying other mechanisms 
are working between shared capitalism and innovation outcomes.  These findings indicate that 
the overall corporate culture that binds employees together (understanding and agreeing with 
common goals, having the tools and involvement to advance those goals, and believing the 29 
 
culture is right to achieve these goals) does play a key role in determining how shared capitalism 
incentives relate to innovation but that there still exists an independent incentive effect from 
shared capitalism. This is very similar to Barnard’s view above concerning the need for a 
package of monetary and non-monetary incentives. The sense of common enterprise that results 
from shared capitalism appears to impact the agency problem by reinforcing a common culture 
among the members of the firm, yet the pure incentive effect of shared rewards themselves also 
appears to focus the individual worker (similar to the findings in Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi, 
2007). 
   High Performance Work Policies. Also reported in Tables 5 and 6 is the mediating role of 
alignment with high performance work policies. Specifically, the analysis reveals that alignment 
partially mediates the relationship that HPWS (Models 1-3) and HPWST (Models4-6) have with 
employees’ perception of a culture for innovation. A similar result is obtained in predicting and 
employees’ willingness and ability to contribute innovative ideas (Table 6).  These results 
indicate that part of the effect of high performance work policies on innovation outcomes is 
through aligning the workforce behind shared goals and objectives. However, since the high 
performance work system coefficients are not reduced to zero, high performance work policies 
also impact the innovation outcomes through additional means.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The principal findings of this paper are that shared capitalism and high performance work 
policies affect innovation outcomes through direct effects, interactions, and indirect effects. The 
results of this study contribute to the current literature on shared capitalism and human resource 
management literature in a number of ways. First, empirical research on the importance of 30 
 
rewards and compensation practices as a means to achieve innovation outcomes is limited. This 
study adds to and extends the literature by examining multiple forms of shared capitalism and 
their impact on innovation outcomes. We demonstrate these effects in a population of adult 
workers in a large sample of respondents in hundreds of work sites, which provides several 
advantages in relation to past research. Additionally, we were able to identify a possible 
mediating mechanism between shared capitalism and innovation outcomes. Second, taking a 
systems perspective, we investigate the impact of two systems of high performance work policies 
on innovation outcomes. While innovation management scholars have examined the impact of 
individual human resource management practices on creativity or innovation, a systems approach 
has, to our knowledge, never been published (Harden, 2006).  
Organizations seeking to develop a culture of innovation could look to this research as an 
answer for how this occurs. Specifically, our results reveal that a culture for innovation can be 
developed and supported through the use of shared capitalism and high performance work 
practices. We found moderate support for the importance of pairing shared capitalism and high 
performance work practices together to achieve the greatest impact on a culture for innovation. 
Additionally, shared capitalism and high performance work practices work in part by aligning 
employees around the goals and objectives of the organization.  
As organizations increasingly depend on all employees to contribute innovative ideas to 
the organization, this research aims to address the role that shared capitalism and high 
performance work policies play to achieve these ends. The results of this study indicate that a 
means to promote employee willingness and ability to contribute innovation ideas is the use of 
high performance work policies and shared capitalism, both of which had a strong positive 
relationship with this outcome. However, an interesting finding of this study is that the impact of 31 
 
shared capitalism on innovative ideas varies by the level of high performance work policies the 
employee experiences in his or her work group. And finally, the indirect effect of high 
performance work practices and shared capitalism on innovative ideas indicates that an aligned 
employee is more willing and able to contribute innovative ideas to the organization. Shared 
capitalism and high performance work practices are one way to align an employee behind the 
goals and objectives of the organization.  This last point introduces a conundrum for the manager 
looking for a practical application of the findings.  A manager can implement shared capitalism 
practices and high performance work practices, but how does a manager implement alignment? 
Does the manager just presume that whatever alignment appears is “produced” by shared 
capitalist and high performance work practices? The answer is no. This would be tantamount to 
flying blind on what will probably be a critical measure of future innovation success for an 
organization. The best response is to regularly measure the workforce’s alignment and use focus 
groups and other methods to assess why alignment may be low and reconceive the practices and 
the overall corporate culture accordingly (Huselid, Becker, & Beatty, 2005). 
To the extent that innovation can be conceived as a principal-agent problem, we have 
demonstrated that a system of shared incentives and a shared high performance employment 
culture at the lowest levels of organizations is important to create both an innovative 
environment that is fertile ground for innovative ideas, and the willingness to work on innovative 
ideas. Taken together, these findings indicate that the overall corporate culture that binds 
employees together does play a key role in determining how shared capitalism incentives relate 
to innovation, but there still exists an independent incentive effect from shared capitalism.        
The sense of common enterprise that results from shared capitalism appears to impact the agency 32 
 
problem by reinforcing a common culture among the members of the firm, yet the pure incentive 
effect of shared rewards themselves also appears to focus the individual worker.  
In summary these findings confirm several of the main themes of agency theory:  that the 
principal-agent problem can be addressed by incentives, and that agency conflicts respond to a 
cooperative culture between workers which encourages mutual monitoring and opportunities to 
share information.  The results of this study make two unique and nuanced contributions to this 
perspective:  first, that it is the combination of shared incentives, cooperative culture, and mutual 
monitoring that works best, and second, that high performance workplace systems help resolve 
agency problems when employees work in teams at the lowest level of the organization that are 
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APPENDIX A:   
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
COMPENSATION 
Shared capitalism index:  10-point index with one point profit sharing eligibility, gain 
sharing eligibility, owning any company stock, holding any stock options, receiving a 
profit sharing bonus in the past year, receiving a gain sharing bonus in the past year, 
having an above-median profit- and gain sharing bonus as a percent of pay, having an 
above-median company stock holding as a percent of pay, receiving a stock option grant 
in the past year, and having above-median stock option holdings as a percent of pay.  
Mean=2.59, s.d.=1.85, n=27507. 
 
Profit/gainsharing: If  “yes” to receives profits based on “company profits or 
performance” and/or “Workgroup or department performance” (0=no, 1=yes). Mean=.74, 
s.d.=.441, n=27676. 
 
Profit/gainsharing as % of base pay:  If “yes” to receive profits based on “company 
profits or performance” and/or “Workgroup or department performance”, divided by 
basepay+overtime, otherwise 0. Mean=.043, s.d.=.090, n=27420 
 
Individual bonus:  "In your job are you eligible for any type of performance-based pay, 
such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-sharing?  What does the size of 
these performance-based payments depend on?  Individual performance" (0=no, 1=yes). 
Mean=.140, s.d.=.343, n=27676 
 
Individual bonus as % of pay:  If "yes" to individual bonus, answer to "What was the 
approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent year of 
bonuses]?" divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0.  Mean=.013, s.d.=.064, n=27609 
 
Stock options:  “Do you currently hold any of this company's stock options (vested or 
unvested)?” (0=no, 1=yes). Mean=.03, s.d.=.179, n=27816 
 
Stock options as % of pay:  If "yes" to "Hold stock options," the sum of answers to 
questions about value of vested and unvested stock, divided by basepay+overtime, 
otherwise 0. Mean=.018, s.d.=.225, n=27716. 
 
Employee ownership: “Employee-owner:  own any stock thru ESOP, ESPP, 401k, kept 
stock after stock option exercise, or open market purchase?” (0=no, 1=yes). Mean=.53, 
s.d.=.499, n=27825 
 
Employee ownership as % of pay:  If "yes" to employee-owner, the sum of answers to 
questions about the amount of stock in different plans, divided by basepay+overtime, 




HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK PRACTICES 
 
High performance work system:  Mean of following 6 binary items: 
a)  “Are you personally involved in any team, committee or task force that addresses 
issues such as product quality, cost cutting, productivity, health and safety, or other 
workplace issues?” (0=no, 1=yes) 
b)  In the last 12 months have you received any formal training from your current 
employer, such as in classes or seminars sponsored by the employer?” (0=no, 1=yes) 
c)  “How frequently do you participate in a job rotation or cross-training program where 
you work or are trained on a job with different duties than your regular job?” 
(0=never or occasionally, 1=frequently) 
d)  “How effective is your work area of team at selecting the very best people to be part 
of our team/area?” (based on 1-7 scale, item coded as 0=ineffective or neutral (1 to 
4), 1=effective (5 to 7)) 
e)  “Thinking about the next twelve months, how likely do you think it is that you will 
lose your job or be laid off?” (0=very or somewhat likely, 1=not very or not at all 
likely) 
f)  “How effective is your work area of team at sharing information and ideas with each 
other?” (based on 1-7 scale, item coded as 0=ineffective or neutral (1 to 4), 
1=effective (5 to 7)) 
Index mean=.46, s.d.=.240, n=27801, alpha=.46. 
 
  High performance work system team: Mean of following items, all measured on a 1-7 
scale (1=very ineffective, 4=neutral, 7=very ineffective) 
a)  “How effective is your work area or team at selecting the very best people to be part 
of our team/area?” 
b)  “How effective is your work area or team at setting clear performance goals ?” 
c)  “How effective is your work area or team at getting training on skills we need to 
solve customer problems?” 
d)  “How effective is your work area or team at sharing information and ideas with each 
other?” 
e)  “How effective is your work area or team at meeting our customers either in our 
facilities or theirs?” 
f)  “How effective is your work area or team at rewarding members of the group for 
excellent work?” 
Index mean=4.36, s.d.=1.32, n=27251, alpha=.88 
 
ALIGNMENT 
Alignment:  Mean of following items, all measured on a 1-4 scale (1=not at all, 2=very 
little, 3=to some extent, 4=to a great extent): 
a)  “To what extent do you understand your company’s overall plan for being 
successful?” 
b)  “To what extent do you personally agree with this plan?” 
c)  “To what extent do you feel that the company is providing you with the information, 
training, and resources necessary to help achieve the goals of this plan” 41 
 
d)  “To what extent do you feel that your company’s culture encourages you to share 
your ideas about how to achieve the goals of this plan?” 




Culture for Innovation: Mean of following items, all measured on a 1-4 scale (1=never 
or almost never, 2=sometimes, 3=often, 4=always or almost always) 
"How often do the following things occur in your facility?"  
a)  “Ideas for developing innovative products and services are put forward” 
b)  “Meaningful time is invested in testing good ideas for innovative products and 
services” 
c)  “Innovative ideas are carefully considered and fairly evaluated” 
d)  “Resources are made available to support and develop a good idea that could lead to 
an innovative product or service” 
e)  “People who have an innovative idea receive recognition for it” 
f)  “People who have an innovative idea receive financial rewards for it” 
g)  “My ideas for innovative products and services have been taken seriously” 
Index mean=2.87, s.d.=.626, n=27067, alpha=.86 
 
Innovative Ideas:  Mean of following items, all measured on a 1-4 scale (1=not at all, 
2=very little, 3=to some extent, 4=to a great extent) 
a)  “I would be willing to be more involved in efforts to develop innovative products and 
services” 
b)  “I have good ideas for innovative products or services” 
c)  “I have good ideas for improvements in existing products and services” 
Index mean=2.74, s.d.=.731, n=26939, alpha=.83 42 
 
APPENDIX B:  The shared capitalist thermometer index 
  As a first step in assessing the relation of shared capitalism to employee outcomes, we 
constructed a thermometer-style index of shared capitalism.  This index assigns one point each 
when the worker was covered by any of the shared capitalist forms of compensation about which 
the survey asked, with additional points for recent bonuses or grants, and for large bonuses or 
stock holdings.  For questions with a continuous numeric answer, we gave the item a value of 1 
if the respondent had a value greater than the median value.  Because there is no natural ordering 
of shared capitalist systems in the sense that a firm first introduces profit-sharing, then adds 
employee ownership, and then gain-sharing, the index is not a Guttman scale.  It is a simple 
summated rating (Bartholomew et al, 2002; Bartholomew, 1996), using dichotomous scoring. 
  In the NBER data there are ten variables in the index, which gives one point each for: 
profit sharing eligibility, gain sharing eligibility, owning any company stock, holding stock 
options, receiving a profit sharing bonus in the past year, receiving a gain sharing bonus in the 
past year, having an above-median profit- and gain sharing bonus as a percent of pay, having an 
above-median company stock holding as a percent of pay, receiving a stock option grant in the 
past year, and having above-median stock option holdings (including unvested options if they 
could be exercised today) as a percent of pay.   
  Indices of this style have both advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, they 
provide a quick and ready measure of the extent of shared capitalist arrangements that makes it 
easy to compare results across surveys and to summarize the broad thrust of findings.  Since our 
firm surveys covered only firms with some shared capitalist arrangements, the index allows us to 
differentiate workers with differing degrees of incentive to their firm’s programs.  On the 
negative side, the index treats different programs the same even though they potentially have 43 
 
different effects on particular outcomes.  It postulates a single scale with equal weights rather 
than using factor analysis or other statistical modelling to obtain weights for given factors.   To 
deal with these problems, we also estimate the relationship of the outcomes to the different types 
of shared capitalism, introduced as dummy or continuous variables in regressions.
4  By 
comparing the results with the shared capitalism index to the results with the disaggregated 
measures, we can assess the loss of information due to the amalgamation of the measures into a 
single index.  
  Figure B1 shows the distribution of our shared capitalism index in the company analyzed 
here.  Close to three-fourths of employees (74%) have at least one form of shared capitalism 
(score of 1 or more).  The distribution is non-normal, with only 5% of workers having scores of 6 
or greater.  The mean score of the index is 2.47.  For our purposes there is sufficient variation in 
the index to differentiate the extent of the shared capitalist “treatment” on workers. 
 
 
                                                      
 
4 There are statistical techniques to deal with the formation of latent variable indices from questions of the sort that 



























































































Predicting a Culture for Innovation 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Shared Capitalism Index  0.013  (0.003) ***        0.000  (0.003)         0.011  (0.003) ***             
Bonuses                               
 Profit/gainsharing        -0.008  (0.013)         -0.038  (0.012) ***      0.009  (0.012)  
  Profit/gainsharing as % of base pay        0.291  (0.070) ***      0.174  (0.067) ***      0.176  (0.065) *** 
 Individual  bonus        0.071  (0.017) ***      0.042  (0.017) **       0.037  (0.016) ** 
  Indiv. bonus as % of base pay       0.007  (0.102)         0.064  (0.098)         0.043  (0.095)   
Employee ownership                               
  Any employee ownership        0.039  (0.012) ***      0.023  (0.011) **       0.027  (0.011) ** 
  Employee-owned stock as % of pay       -0.005  (0.010)         -0.010  (0.010)         0.000  (0.010)   
Stock options                               
  Stock option holding       0.031  (0.031)         0.039  (0.029)         0.015  (0.028)   
  Stock option value as % of base pay       0.045  (0.031)         0.055  (0.029)  *       0.038  (0.029)   
                               
High Performance Work Policies                                                       
 HPWS            0.806  (0.016)  ***  0.802  (0.016)  ***         
 HPWST                      0.180  (0.003)  ***  0.179  (0.003)  *** 
                                
n   26364     25832     26361     25830     25977     25458    
Adjusted R-sq  0.054     0.058     0.134     0.137     0.184     0.186    
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)                              
^ All regressions include controls for country (22 dummies), occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years,   
  hours worked per week, union status, age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids,        






Predicting Innovative Ideas 
   Independent Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Shared Capitalism Index  0.012 (0.003)  ***        0.006 (0.003) **        0.012 (0.003)  ***       
Bonuses                           
 Profit/gainsharing       -0.027  (0.014)  *       -0.039  (0.014)  ***       -0.020  (0.014)   
  Profit/gainsharing as % of base pay       -0.005  (0.078)         -0.057  (0.078)         -0.032  (0.078)   
 Individual  bonus       0.040  (0.020)  **       0.027  (0.019)         0.033  (0.019)  * 
  Indiv. bonus as % of base pay       0.221  (0.114)  *       0.248  (0.114)  **       0.224  (0.114)  ** 
Employee ownership                           
  Any employee ownership       0.072  (0.013)  ***       0.065  (0.013)  ***       0.070  (0.013)  *** 
  Employee-owned stock as % of pay       0.008  (0.011)         0.005  (0.011)         0.009  (0.011)   
Stock options                           
  Stock option holding       -0.026  (0.034)         -0.022  (0.034)         -0.028  (0.034)   
  Stock option value as % of base pay       -0.012  (0.034)         -0.009  (0.034)         -0.018  (0.034)   
                           
High Performance Work Policies                           
 HPWS             0.350  (0.019)  ***  0.347  (0.019)  ***           
 HPWST                    0.042  (0.003)  ***  0.041  (0.003)  *** 
                            
n   26252     25728      26249     25726     25875     25362    
Adjusted R-sq  0.146     0.148     0.156     0.158     0.149     0.151    
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)                          
^ All regressions include controls for country (22 dummies), occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years, 
  hours worked per week, union status, age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, 




Interactions Between Shared Capitalism and High Performance Work Policies in Predicting Innovation Outcomes 
      Culture for Innovation Innovative  Ideas 
   Independent Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4 
Shared Capitalism Index  -0.007 (0.005)    -0.023 (0.007)  ***  0.028 (0.006)  ***  0.032 (0.009)  *** 
HPWS  0.768 (0.027) ***       0.463 (0.031) ***      
HPWST       0.161  (0.005)  ***       0.053  (0.006)  *** 
                       
Shared Capitalism Index                      
 *HPWS  0.015 (0.009)  *        -0.045 (0.010)  ***      
 *HPWST       0.007  (0.002)  ***       -0.004  (0.002)  ** 
                       
                       
n   26361     25977     26250     25875     
Adjusted R-sq  0.134     0.185     0.157     0.149     
                                         
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses) 
 ^ All regressions include controls for country (22 dummies), occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in 
years, hours worked per week, union status, age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, race (4 







Predicting Employee Alignment with Company Strategy 
Independent Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Shared Capitalism Index  0.010  (0.003)  ***        0.014  (0.005)  *** 0.024  (0.003)  ***       0.009  (0.007)  
Bonuses                               
 Profit/gainsharing       0.016  (0.013)              0.075  (0.012)  ***      
  Profit/gainsharing as % of base pay       0.118  (0.070)  *            0.139  (0.068)        
 Individual  bonus       0.053  (0.017)  ***            0.050  (0.017)  **      
  Indiv. bonus as % of base pay       0.058  (0.101)              0.012  (0.097)        
Employee ownership                               
  Any employee ownership       0.009  (0.012)              0.017  (0.011)        
  Employee-owned stock as % of pay       0.011  (0.010)              0.022  (0.010)  **      
Stock options                               
  Stock option holding       0.070  (0.031)  **            0.035  (0.030)        
  Stock option value as % of base pay       0.021  (0.032)              0.008  (0.031)        
High Performance Work Policies                               
 HPWS  1.085 (0.017)  *** 1.081  (0.017) *** 1.106 (0.028) ***                   
 HPWST                 0.230  (0.003)  ***  0.230  (0.003)  ***  0.222  (0.005)  *** 
 Shared Capitalism Index                               
 *  HPWS             -0.008  (0.009)                
 *  HPWST                           0.003  (0.002)  ** 
                                
n   26787     26243     26787      26348     25819     26348    
Adjusted R-sq   0.220     0.221      0.220     0.275    0.275     0.275    
                                  
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)   
 ^ All regressions include controls for country (22 dummies), occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years, hours worked per week, union status, 















Environment  Alignment 
Innovative  
Environment 
Shared Capitalism Index  0.000 (0.003)    0.010 (0.003)  *** -0.002 (0.002)    0.011  (0.003)  ***  0.024  (0.003)  ***  0.005  (0.002)  * 
                                
High Performance Work 
Policies                               
 HPWS  0.806 (0.016)  ***  1.085 (0.017)  ***  0.446 (0.017)  ***                   
 HPWST                 0.180  (0.003)  ***  0.230  (0.003)  ***  0.117  (0.003)  *** 
                                
Alignment            0.313  (0.006)  ***            0.271  (0.006)  *** 
                                
n   26361     26787     26145     25976     26347          
Adjusted R-sq  0.134     0.220     0.237     0.184     0.275          
                                                           
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)   
^ All regressions include controls for country (22 dummies), occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years, hours worked per week, 
union status, age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(fixed pay), and company fixed 
effects. 
 
Sobel Test HPWS: 40.39 (p=.000) 
Sobel Test Shared Capitalism: 7.88 (p=.000) 






Mediating Role of Alignment in Predicting Innovative Ideas 
     










Independent Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Shared Capitalism Index  0.006 (0.003) **  0.010 (0.003) ***  0.006 (0.003) **  0.012 (0.003) ***  0.024 (0.003) ***  0.011 (0.003) *** 
                                 
High Performance Work Policies                                
 HPWS  0.350 (0.019) ***  1.085 (0.017) ***  0.311 (0.020) ***                  
 HPWST                 0.042  (0.003)  ***  0.230  (0.003)  ***  0.031  (0.004)  *** 
                                 
Alignment            0.036  (0.007)  ***             0.047  (0.007)  *** 
                                 
n   26250     26786     26039     25875     26347     25703    
Adjusted R-sq  0.156     0.220     0.157     0.149     0.275     0.151    
                                                           
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)   
^ All regressions include controls for country (22 dummies), occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years, hours worked per week, union 
status, age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(fixed pay), and company fixed effects. 
 
Sobel Test HPWS: 5.13 (p=.000) 
Sobel Test Shared Capitalism: 5.14 (p=.000) 
Sobel Test HPWTS: 6.69 (p=.000) 